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What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or oth-
erwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of 
necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the es-
sence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problem-
atic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, 
that is, if the suspension continues, which continues the problem. But what is problematic about 
suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of 
implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the 
suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about 
language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of 
anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is 
an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by 
implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implica-
tion? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even 
possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for 
thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatso-
ever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect.
Key words: Apodeictic, aspect, assertoric, being, implication, problematic, suspension, time, 
unity.
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В чем же проблема? В чем состоит проблематичность проблемы, не важно, философской 
или любой другой? Проблематичность как источник утверждения и аподиктического суждения 
подвешивает такие категории, как необходимость и случайность, возможность и невозможность. 
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И именно эта подвешенность является сущностью проблемы, в силу чего проблема вообще ока-
зывается подвешиваемой. Но тогда насколько проблема проблематична? Настолько, насколько 
то, что подвешено, не проясняется и не исчезает, т. е. насколько подвешивание длится, продле-
вая тем самым проблему. Но что составляет проблематичность подвешивания? Как показывают 
размышления о языке, проблема подвешивания — это проблема импликации. Например, если 
бытие просто подразумевается, не будучи присутствующим или отсутствующим, тогда мы име-
ем дело с подвешиванием как присутствия, так и отсутствия, по крайней мере, пока эта альтер-
натива является проблематичной. И это говорит кое-что не только о языке; более того, это также 
имеет онтологические импликации в той мере, в какой речь идет о бытии вообще и о бытии чего 
угодно. Поскольку если бытие подразумевается, если в этом состоит проблема бытия, то это 
так, потому что бытие есть нечто подразумеваемое. Но что значит для бытия: не быть ни при-
сутствием, ни отсутствием, но быть имплицитно данным? Это значит, что бытие дано в качестве 
проблематичного прежде, чем оно оказывается необходимым, или даже возможным. Ведь бытие 
характеризуется подвешиванием, которое имеет следствия для мышления и разговора о бытии, 
вопросах и проблемах, касающихся чего угодно. Это также влияет на то, что подразумевает бы-
тие, а именно, на единство, время и выражение.
Ключевые слова: Аподиктический, выражение, ассерторический, бытие, импликация, про-
блематическое, подвешивание, время, единство.
What is a problem? The question is three-fold. It asks about the what of a problem, 
not just a philosophical problem, but any problem whatsoever; about the problem, about 
what is problematic about the problem; about the is of a problem, its being, that is, 
the being of the problem, and what is implied thereby.
1. The problematic of the problem
There are, as Kant reminds us, two kinds of problems: conceptual problems, the 
easy, or easier, ones — which are not really problematic, but are non-problematic prob-
lems; and metaphysical problems, the tough ones — at least insofar as they cause prob-
lems, remain problematic. Conceptual problems are a question of knowledge, of the 
understanding of objects; metaphysical problems are a matter for thought, for reason. 
For there are things we cannot know and «yet must be able to think» — and that is the 
problem.1 
So, how can we think a problem without knowing it, without rendering it a non-
problem, without translating it into the language and logic of that which is no problem at 
all? In other words, what is actually problematic about the problem, about any problem 
whatsoever? And how can it be thought?
On the one hand, the conceptually or categorically problematic is neither asser-
toric nor apodeictic.2  This is in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Table of Judgments, 
1 (Kant, 1900, III: B xxvi), my emphasis; see also: (Kant, 1900, III: B19, IV: 276, II: 83, 197).
2 (Kant, 1900, IV: A70–76/III: B 96–101, VIII: 193–194); see also: (Kant, 1900, IV: 414–415, IX:108). 
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the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments, which is the Clue to the Dis-
covery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding. Judgments are a question of quantity, 
quality, relation or modality. And when it comes to modal judgment: «…we first judge 
something problematically, then take its truth assertorically, and finally claim it as in-
separably united with understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic» (Kant, 1900, 
IV: A76/III: B101). Indeed, the problem is out of which the assertion comes, and which 
ends in the apodeiction. So the differences in these three modes of judgment, antecedens 
et consequens, are categorically clear. In apodeictic judgments, affirmation or negation is 
viewed as necessary, notwendig; or unnecessary, zufällig, contingent, if the judgement is 
not a priori determined, bestimmt, by the laws of the understanding. In assertoric judg-
ments, affirmation or negation is real, true, an assertion of existence, of actually being 
there, of that which is the case, of what is wirklich, the presence of what is present; or 
unreal, untrue, false, fiction, like a waxworks figure, if the judgment asserts that which 
is not, not the case, not really being there or true, being not actually the case, unwirklich, 
so not present, but absent, not bound or verbunden to the laws of the understanding. In 
problematic judgements, affirmation or negation is taken to be possible, möglich; or its 
other, ἑτερότης, impossible, unmöglich, the negation or privation, στέρησις of possibil-
ity — at least insofar as the judgment is admitted, aufgenommen, by the understanding 
(Kant, 1900, II: 171). 
Problematic knowledge then, is not a problem — for it is simply a question of know-
ing, subsuming in accordance with the law of non-contradiction, determining whether 
a judgment is possible or not. So while we must apodeict analytically from «all bodies 
are extended», to «this body is extended», or synthetically that 12 necessarily follows 
from 7+5; and we can assert that the Earth actually revolves around the Sun; we may 
only claim to know that vollkommene Gerechtigkeit, perfect or complete justice, is a pos-
sibility — for it can neither be determined as necessary a priori, nor shown to be actually 
present in the world, as Hegel might claim.3 For example, although nothing speaks for 
the impossibility of a perfectly just world, we must admit that it may turn out to be im-
perfect, even unjust. And if justice is not just ideal, but has its essence in the real world, 
and has not yet come to presence, insofar as history remains open, perhaps infinite; then 
we should probably not be surprised that the existence of perfect justice continues to be 
a question, a possibility of perfect justice, thus a perfection that is neither necessary nor 
actual.
On the other hand, there is another kind of problem, the metaphysically problem-
atic — for knowledge of the conceptually problematic cannot be stretched to cover the 
entire sphere, Gebiet, of the problem.4 So we must necessarily think that which exceeds 
all understanding, empirical or transcendental, that of which we can have no intuition or 
3 (Hegel, 1970, 24); (Kant, 1900, IV: A75/III: B100, IV:A 347/III:B 405). 
4 (Kant, 1900, IV: A255/III: B 310, X:132, 144, 266, II: 283).
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representation or concept, which is not categorically intelligible. And we must find a lan-
guage to speak about that which goes beyond all conceptual discourse — but without 
simply translating or twisting the problematic problem into the unproblematic. For such 
a sophistical subterfuge, however normal nowadays, merely seeks to avoid a difficult 
question, to escape the tough problem by changing its meaning to suit our own abilities 
(Kant, 1900, IV: A 257/III: B 313). Rather, if the conceptually problematic is determined 
(in knowing and speaking) by the categories of the possible and the impossible, then we 
must seek to think a third, das Dritte. So Kant insists: the metaphysically problematic is 
that about which «we can neither say that it is possible nor that it is impossible» (Kant, 
1900, IV: A287/III: B 343). Indeed, possibility and impossibility are categories that do 
not apply to the thinking and speaking of problems qua problematic. We may think, for 
example, the idea of soul, world, or God as thought-entities or thought-things, Gedan-
kendinge; but we can neither reduce them to concrete substances nor transcendental 
concepts, neither to objects of the understanding nor to presentations or representations, 
neither to objects of possible experience nor to that which could not possibly be in any-
way whatsoever, like some kind of impossible object or concept.5 And if «the division 
into the possible and the impossible» is «the highest concept with which it is normal to 
begin a transcendental-philosophy» — well then, we will presumably have to go beyond 
the norm, to relinquish the usual subterfuge, die gewöhnliche Ausflucht, to give up the 
philosophy of the possible and the impossible, whether it dominates the present age, 
whether it seems to determine our words and deeds, thoughts and things, or not. For 
the problematic — the metaphysically problematic, that which is truly problematic, the 
tough problem or problematic problem — this resists the translations and transpositions, 
the permutations and combinations, the destructions and deconstructions, of the history 
of philosophy as the metaphysics of possibility (and impossibility); even if that means 
getting along without determining whether the problem is or is not, is necessarily or pos-
sibly, is «something or nothing», Etwas oder Nichts, that is, whether there is any problem 
whatsoever (Kant, 1900, IV:A 290/III: B 346).
If the problem of the problem then, is neither a question of the possible nor the im-
possible, is it merely a limit concept, a horizon of thought and word, so an empty object 
without concept, nihil negativum? In other words, is the problem something about which 
we cannot speak — and so must «remain silent» (Wittgenstein, 1921, §7)? Or is there 
a third thing, das Dritte — so tertium dator — a way of thinking that which is neither 
something nor nothing? And so suspends the philosophy of possibility and impossibility 
alike?
Indeed, the suspension of the problem is the suspension of the problem — for it is 
precisely this suspending (of apodeiction and assertion, something and nothing, the nec-
essary and the unnecessary, the possible and the impossible) that points the way to the 
5 (Kant, 1900, IV: A 335/III:B 392, IV:A 771/III:B 799).
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problem, to a philosophy of the problem, or a problematic philosophy. And this is what 
appears in Husserl under the name: ἐποχή, that is, the suspension which characterizes 
the essence of the problem, which is probably why the experience of the problematic is 
so suspenseful. 
So, what does it mean to suspend the possibility and impossibility of the prob-
lem? The ἐποχή is not just skeptical doubt, whether Greek or Cartesian or some other 
form; nor merely a question of necessarily abstaining or excluding, white-washing or 
washing-away, nor simply altering or changing from one possibility to another, nor just 
retreating to the assertion of impossibility, nor to both the possible and the impossible; 
much less assuming or presuming, supposing or presupposing, determining or judging 
(necessity or contingency), negating or destroying, destructuring or deconstructing — 
rather, it is a way of holding, of keeping and keeping oneself back, of continuously 
holding back from judgment, Urteilsenthaltung (Husserl, 1977a, §§31–32). As a way 
of holding then, the ἐποχή allows us to bear or carry the weight of what is held, borne 
or carried, vertragen. And in order to hold ourselves in a way so as to bear it, the ἐποχή 
suspends judgment — including, for example, the natural attitude, consciousness, the 
natural and human sciences, prejudices and prejudicial significations, self-contradictory 
interpretations, the transcendent, the unity of mind and body, «Man», everything that 
«presents itself to me as factually existing» actuality (Husserl, 1977a, §§30, 88), that 
which seems to be actually and really there or not there, but elsewhere, as well as the 
categories of judgment and conceptual knowledge (necessity and contingency, existence 
and non-existence, possibility and impossibility). For in order to uncover the problem 
(even that which is problematic about things such as the absolute givenness of essences, 
transcendental consciousness, phenomena, intentional objects, cogitatum qua cogita-
tum), the ἐποχή transforms or translates or metamorphosizes, puts out of action or play, 
shuts or closes off, contains or parenthesizes; but not only negatively — for parenthesiz-
ing a judgment simpliciter holds onto it as a «parenthesized judgement»; and «the sus-
pended thesis» is «the thesis suspended».6 Thus the problematic ἐποχή does not simply 
produce some kind of residuum, like pure subjectivity or transcendental ego, essence or 
6 (Husserl, 1973, 60); (Husserl, 1977a, §31). For Husserl as a philosopher of possibility, see: (Heidegger, 
1977, 38). For an examination of Husserl’s loyalty to the philosophy of presence, see: (Derrida, 1967, 
73, 92, 96, 115). For a reflection on human beings as suspended, see Kafka’s landsman in «Before 
the Law», or Zarathustra’s comment: «Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over 
an abyss. A dangerous crossing, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous 
shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved 
in man is that he is a going-over and a going-under» (Nietzsche, 1967, Part I, §4). For a consideration 
of the ethical ἐποχή, see the problem of Hamlet’s mother — for «in some three hundred years’ time, 
no consensus has been reached on this issue» of her guilt or innocence, complicity or participation; 
rather, it is suspended insofar as Shakespeare places «the question of the [presence of the] mother’s 
guilt, or absence of it, between brackets» (Schmitt, 2006, 14–15). 
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εἶδος, whether necessary or possible; rather, it allows us to think how what is reduced 
continues to be a problem (and the continuation of suspense, of what is suspended and 
the suspending itself — loss is a gain; putting out of play keeps in play; that which is in 
brackets remains bracketed; being suspended is being suspended).
And so too with the problem itself. Holding back from necessity and contingency, 
possibility and impossibility, something and nothing, suspending the usual subterfuge 
of the concepts by means of which we normally know and judge — this is the problem 
(and the way to think what is problematic about the problem, any problem whatsoever, 
if it is problematic). For suspension is that which suspends knowledge, and the neces-
sary conditions of the possibility of knowledge — and the entire history of philosophy as 
a philosophy of the necessary or the possible, or its other, the contingent and the impossi-
ble — while continuing it qua problematic. But then the suspension of the problematic is 
just as much a problematic suspension; and not only knowing, but thinking too becomes 
problematic, even an exercise in making problems, that is, in suspending. And we may 
no longer be able to determine that there is necessarily a problem here, or there, or none 
at all, or that there may possibly be one, or must necessarily be one, or cannot be one, or 
that it is impossible to say that there is one — for all this unsuspends or deparenthesizes 
that which is problematic about the problem.
So what does it mean for the problem to be suspended? Or for thinking? And how 
can we think that which such a problematization renders problematic? For what does it 
mean «to be a problem»? In other words, what is the being of the problem?
2. The being of the problem
Indeed, the question of the being of the problem implies the question of being itself. 
And this problem is the Platonic problem which leads Kant to «the central problem which 
has to be posed in the task of laying the foundation of a science of beings in general», 
which leads Heidegger to pose the problem that «underlying all beings are the principles 
of their being», which leads us to the problem of the being of the problem (Heidegger, 
1977b, 46; my emphasis).7 So what is the being of the problem? What is being? And is 
this a problem? And if so, how so?
In fact, as Heidegger argues, since the Greeks, being has been understood neither 
as a particular being, nor as a genus (Aristotle, 1957, 998b), nor as a real predicate 
7 Heidegger raises «the question of the problem» in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1929 
(Heidegger, 1991), two years after Being and Time, a text which remains within «the horizon of 
the Kantian problem» (Heidegger, 1977а, 31) — not just because it stays loyal to a philosophy 
of possibility (and impossibility — which may very well constitute the essence of transcendental 
philosophy as a whole), but because it follows Kant («the first and only» one to connect the problem 
of being with the problem of time) in forgetting about unity and aspect (Heidegger, 1977а, 23); see 
also: (Heidegger, 1991, xvi, xvii, 1; Heidegger,1975, 36–107; Heidegger,1984, 97).
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(Kant, 1900, IV: A 598/III: B 626) — for they do «not suffice to name everything that 
“is”» (Heidegger, 1983, 155) — but rather as presence (Heidegger, 1983, 46). In this 
way, coming into being, into existence or reality, appearing and showing, emerging and 
growing, means coming into presence out of absence, and so going out into absence; just 
as standing and staying, resting and remaining — throughout change and movement, 
identity throughout difference — means being continuously present, coming out of dis-
continuity. And whatever name the history of philosophy (or the history of philosophy as 
metaphysics, the study of being qua being, τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν) gives to being, to «everything that 
is», whatever determination comes to dominance, whether φύσις, number, matter, λόγος, 
ἕν, ἰδέα, οὐσία, essentia, existentia, God or the gods, ego, substance, reason, object, con-
cept, spirit, will, power, etc. — it remains true to presence:
a definite, unitary trait runs through them all. It points our understanding of «to be» 
toward a definite horizon by which the understanding is fulfilled. The boundary drawn 
around the sense of «being» stays within the sphere of presentness and presence.8
So being is presence — for «from the dawn of Western-European thinking until 
today, being means the same as presencing» (Heidegger, 2007, 6).
But what is presence? It is not just a what, but a how — that is, how something 
is, how it presents itself, appears, shows itself, how it shines forth as what it is, the 
φαινόμενoν, and the kind of being that it is; it is the way beings are, and thus, how 
problems, insofar as they are, are as well.9 For being is itself not a being, although it is 
«always the being of a being», and so cannot be traced back to another, more original 
being; rather, being is the way any being whatsoever comes to presence. So if we say, 
for example, «the celebration took place in the presence of many guests», we mean that 
it took place «with many guests being present» — for here, being means present, letting 
be present, allowing to come to presence, revealing the presence of that which is present, 
unconcealing the event of being present, of being there (Heidegger, 2007, 14). And ab-
sence is merely its other, another, negative, privative, deficient way of being present, the 
event of non-being, non-presence — like an abyss that is there insofar as it is not there, 
or a Abgrund that still serves as a «Grund» (Heidegger, 1993, 48). Indeed, as
[the] being present of something <…> absence is constitutive for this presence, absence 
in the sense of deficiency, lack. This being-there in the sense of lack is completely its 
8 (Heidegger, 1983, 69); see: (Heidegger, 2007, 11; Heidegger, 1977a, 25; Heidegger, 1989, 193). 
On presence as a metaphysical problem, even the problem of ontology, onto-theology, or onto-
henology — or more precisely, metaphysics qua onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, see: (Haas, 
2007a, 196).
9 (Heidegger, 1977a, 6, 27; Heidegger, 1985a, 50).
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own and positive. If I say of someone: «I miss him very much, he is not there», I pre-
cisely do not mean to say that he is not there, but express a quite particular way that 
he is there for me.10
Thus absence is a modality of presence, a way of presenting as non-presenting, 
present deprived of presence, or present by being absent — for being present and being 
absent are how being is, at least insofar as being is understood within the sphere of pres-
entness, which is why presence is what being is.
So, for example, a natural thing — just as much as a cultural one — is present 
or absent in nature; and nature as a whole is this coming into presence and going out 
into absence; it is how trees and forests, plants, animals and humans, come to life, pro-
duce and reproduce, appear and unfold themselves in words and deeds, as thoughts and 
things, here and now, repeatedly, continuously, and then go there, out of presence into 
absence or death, once and for all, or again and again. For the being of nature, and natu-
ral things, is the presencing and absencing of what is. Thus, natural beings are present 
and absent — whether as a stone or animal, earth or world, once or forever, us or a god, 
mortal or immortal, real or ideal, in motion or at rest, potential or actual, necessary or 
contingent, possible or impossible — in accordance with different ways of presencing 
and absencing, that is, being. 
But what does it mean to think being qua presence, or rather presence and absence? 
In fact, it means thinking being in relation to time — for being present (and/or absent) 
means being in time, happening at this time or that, simultaneously or not; or more pre-
cisely, insofar as «in» or «inness» is misleading, it means being temporally. And what 
is this time to which being is related? It is neither what we see on watches nor a mea-
sure of motion (Aristotle, 1950, 219b2), neither the order of things nor their schema 
(Kant, 1900, A142–143/B182); rather, time is a how, that is, how something comes to 
be, to presence, and so to be present (Heidegger, 2004, 124) — which is why ontology is 
essentially onto-chronology, and «the history of the concept of time…is the history of the 
10 (Heidegger, 2002, 311); see also: (Heidegger, 2007, 17–18). This privileging of presence motivates 
the deconstruction of the philosophy of presence: on the one hand, analogous to Augustine’s analysis 
of time, absence is only thought on the basis of presence, which clarifies how that which is not present 
can still be — by being-absent; on the other hand, the possibility of absence, non-being, nothingness, 
non-presence (as well as the non-now, past and future, the non-possible or impossibility, the non-self 
or other, heterogeneity, difference, etc.), is undercut, translated or transmuted into presence–and there 
is no absence, merely a modification of presence; or absence is simply presence, a yet more devious 
means for maintaining the privilege of presence (Derrida, 1972, 33–34). For a discussion of a political 
philosophy of the possible and the impossible, see for example: (Derrida, 2001, 75–77; Derrida, 
2003, 122–123). On the event of the abyss of being (or beyng), see for example: (Heidegger, 1989, 
30, 371–388); (Haas, 2007b, 88–90). For a consideration of the ambiguity of being in Heidegger 
(presence/absence, event/non-event, Ereignis/Enteignis), see: (Haas, 2015b).
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question of the being of beings».11 In other words, time is the character of beings — not 
simply zeitlich, but temporal — and being implies time. Thus the meaning of being can 
only be illuminated in relation to temporality, which is why «time is the horizon for any 
understanding of being whatsoever».12
But if being qua presence is temporal — well then, what does that mean for be-
ings which come to be in time? Language gives us a clue — for presence, present time, 
is a tense. This is why problems — and in fact, any word or deed, thought or thing — ap-
pear as tensed: we say that we have a problem in present tense; or that he had a problem 
in past tense; or that she will have a problem in future tense — although by «having», 
we mean «being»; a problem is present, it belongs to us, or we happen to have it with 
another. Or if we claim a problem comes from something, or has ramifications for some-
one, or if they have succumb to their problem, or if there is a problem, or no problem — 
then we mean that there is an event in which it comes to presence and presents itself, 
whether it requires a response or not. Or if we are told that we are no longer «a problem 
child», we know the problem, which was present in our behavior, which showed itself 
in this act or that, is now absent, that is, present as having been overcome. For tense is 
a determination of verbs, which is why they are called Zeitwörte, time-words, in Ger-
man. And if conjugation discloses action, how the deed is done, the way in which events 
occur — whether eating or drinking, sensing and imagining, knowing and understand-
ing, speaking or thinking, doing or making, having or being — it is because all verbs take 
time; or more precisely, because language is not just in time, but is temporal.
Then, so too with problems: if presence is understood as the way something is, 
then it is how something is problematic (1) in the present, being there now; or (2) was in 
the past, and so is present qua having been, whether in memory or retention; or (3) will 
be in the future, and so present qua to be, whether in protention or anticipation (even 
if different times, implying one another, are what let problems be how they are, were 
and will be, just as being is what lets time come into presence and go out into absence). 
So no problem of time without being and no being problematic without time, which is 
why the presence and absence of being has the temporality of the present or non-present 
(past or future). In other words, a problem is one, or becomes one, only insofar as it is 
present or comes to presence, presents itself in one way or another. Thus, a problem is 
an actual problem, or is a possible one, a problem that is problematic for me or you, us 
or them, here or there, now or then, a problem that is one of words or deeds, thoughts or 
things, one that is real or imaginary, a problem that is conceptual or metaphysical, that 
presents itself as necessarily or possibly, actually or potentially, solvable or insolvable — 
all these ways of being a problem, of being problematic, are ways in which problems are 
present now or not now, how they come to presence and present themselves, or present 
11 (Heidegger, 1979, 191); see: (Heidegger, 2002, 313, 379); (Heidegger, 1976, §15); (Haas, 2015a).
12 (Heidegger, 1977a), «Front-piece»; see: (Heidegger, 1977a, 25); (Heidegger, 1975, 435). 
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themselves as non-problems, no longer problematic, solved or resolved, possibly even 
old and tired, having been superseded or overcome, and so absent.
And yet, if the being of a problem is its presence, how it is present (or absent), which 
implies that it has its tense, its time — then it also has its aspect. For time alone cannot 
account for the ways of being of a problem, nor for how being is. Another clue from 
language: all verbs, like being, have tense (past-present-future, now and not-now, pres-
ent and non-present) and aspect (simple-continuous-completed, complete and incom-
plete) — which is neither mood (indicative-subjunctive-optative), nor voice (active-mid-
dle-passive); and certainly nothing like perspective or view, side or face.13 Rather, aspect 
is the other of time; it is the way in which anything whatsoever is at each and every time, 
and at any time whatsoever. Aspect is the other how of deeds done, of everything that is. 
So at one and the same time, I can think (discontinuously-completely) and be thinking 
(continuously-incompletely) about a problem, even one like perfect justice — in pres-
ent time, or with the temporality of what is present; I might have thought and have been 
thinking about it; or I shall think and shall have thought it. And the difference between 
these ways of being, of being a problem, whether conceptually or metaphysically, is an 
aspectual difference. But then every temporal problem is an aspectual one as well; or any 
time a problem happens to come to presence, presents or absences itself, it does so with 
aspect — for being, and being a problem, or being problematic, has a double-character, 
temporal-aspectual, at least insofar as aspect is the other of time.14
But not just time — for being too has its other. As Aristotle reminds us:
Now, if being and unity are the same and are of one nature in the sense that they are 
implied by one another as principle and cause, but not in the sense that they have the 
same definition <…> for «one man» and «man» are the same thing, and so are «being 
man» and «man» and the doubling of the words in «one man and being one man» does 
not express anything different; it is clear that the two things are not separated either in 
coming to be or in ceasing to be <…> so that it is obvious that the addition in these 
cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being… — all this being 
so, there must be exactly as many kinds of being as of unity (Aristotle, 1957, 1003b 
22–34).
13 (Haas, 2015a). Modality is not aspect — for it does not refer to any character of the event, but simply 
to the proposition’s status (Palmer, 2001, 1). For the difference between Zeitstufen and Aktionsarten, 
see: (Heidegger, 1977a, §68). For grammatical aspect, see: (Comrie, 1976). The consideration of the 
extent to which Heidegger (from Being and Time to «Time and Being») reduces aspect to a function 
of time, thereby failing to think being qua aspectual, is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
14 An onto-chronological consideration of the problem would have to be supplemented with a study 
of its aspect; or rather, «the study of aspect in general», which I have elsewhere suggested should 
perhaps rightly take the name of «phenomenology» (Haas, 2015a, 9).
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So the other of time is aspect, and the other of being is unity — then if a problem 
is to be one, a problem, if it comes to presence now and continuously, it does so as 
an indivisible or divisible one, separate or inseparable from others (Aristotle, 1957, 
1052b16). And this is why the history of philosophy as metaphysics is able to determine 
being under a unitary trait: for if φύσις, number, matter, λόγος, ἕν, ἰδέα, οὐσία, essentia, 
existentia, God, ego, substance, reason, object, concept, spirit, will, power, presence — 
and if any of these are to be the meaning of being, it is because each is one. For unity is 
how things are — not a unit, nor the unit of all units (like the set of all sets); it is the way 
in which something is, how it presents itself, appears, comes to presence as indivisible 
and goes out into absence, is what it is. In this way, unity is how each thing can be uni-
fied, united, both in itself and with others. So if we say something like, «the celebration 
took place in the presence of many guests», we mean «many guests attended one celebra-
tion» — for unity means indivisibility, letting each guest be one, separate and together; 
and every guest can be present at the event that was celebrated because the celebration 
was one. And unity characterizes how something is, so that it can be what it is, if it is 
anything at all: whether a plant or animal, stone or human or god, a celebratory event or 
a non-event, a real Ereignis or even a so-called Enteignis, appropriation or expropriation 
(Heidegger, 2007, 28), in fact, any word or deed, thought or thing — if it is, it is because 
it is one. Indeed, unity and being imply one another. For unity is the way in which «ev-
erything that is» is, if it is in anyway whatsoever; how things — and things like prob-
lems — are real or ideal, in motion or rest, potential or actual, necessary or unnecessary, 
possible or impossible; how they come to presence or go out into absence. Thus the 
problem is not simply a question of being, of the being of the problem, or of anything 
whatsoever; but just as much of its unity and time and aspect, of its way of being one, 
temporally and aspectually.
3. The implication of being
So, being and unity, time and aspect — these would seem essential for any under-
standing of the problem, even for thinking what is problematic about the problem. But 
what are they? Or, at least (if we suspend discussion of unity and time and aspect):15 what 
is being — such that it could be the being of a problem? Or, if being is not just the what, 
but the how of any problem whatsoever, then is it merely presence and/or absence — and 
tertium non datur, there is no third, kein Drittes. Or is there? 
15 In Unity and Aspect (forthcoming), I have attempted to illuminate the problems or implications of 
being, unity, time and aspect, and how they relate to us, or how they are implicated in and by us (not 
only in human beings, ἄνθρωπος or ἀνήρ, nor simply in the being of human beings as Dasein, but just 
as much by how we are one temporally and aspectually — something which perhaps rightly bears the 
other ancient name for us, φώς, the illuminating one, which is not merely φῶς, light). See: (Homer, 
1922, 21.26); (Homer, 1920, 17.377); (Aeschylus, 1973, 398); (Sophocles, 1990, 107).
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For as Aristotle reminds us: being and unity are implied by one another (Aristotle, 
1957, 1003b22–24). But what does that mean? To imply? To be implied? To be an impli-
cation? Implied by «everything that is», and so by problems?
Another clue from language — for as Benjamin (twenty years before Heidegger) 
writes: «language alone speaks».16 In Greek, Heraclitus says: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων 
(Diels, 1960, B119).17 McKirahn translates: «a person’s character is his divinity» (Diels, 
1996, 40; my emphasis); or Kahn: «Man’s character is his fate» (Kahn, 1979, 81; my 
emphasis). Or Heidegger — in typical Heideggerian fashion: «the (familiar) abode for 
humans is the opening for the presencing of the (un-familiar) god» (Heideger, 1996, 356; 
my emphasis). But the word «is» is not in the original — for being is not present, which 
is not to say it is absent; rather, it is implied, an implication. And here, implication is the 
problem; it is that which fails to present itself, cannot appear, which is not to say that it 
disappears. But what is implied can be neither necessarily nor even possibly determined 
as appearing, nor simply asserted to be that which cannot appear; it is that which cannot 
even be judged to be something or nothing, here or there, now or then, never or always. 
In this sense, implication is not the opposite or negation of explication, nor can it simply 
be translated into the language of the explicit, made explicit or explained, at least not 
without losing precisely that which is being implied. Rather, implication is the problem-
atic suspension of presence and absence, and so suspends the possibility and impossibil-
ity, the necessity and contingency, of explication — and so presumably that which makes 
impression and expression, the coming to presence of explanation, and the historical 
overcoming of explanation by explanation, so suspenseful. And this is why Heraclitus 
simply says: human character divine — for «to be» does not mean «to be present», but 
«to be implied»; being is implying, which is the problem.
Or, in English, «Ode on a Grecian Urn» ends with the following: «When old age 
shall this generation waste, / Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe / Than ours, 
a friend to man, to whom thou sayst, / “Beauty is truth, truth [is] beauty”, — that is 
all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know».18 In other words, «is» is not present, 
and not just absent either — for being is implied. And being’s way of being is what the 
poem is about; it is the secret of the poem, if not of ποίησις itself, a secret kept hidden in 
full-view, suspended before our eyes, neither visible nor invisible, neither there nor not-
16 (Benjamin, 1991, II.1, 144); (Heidegger, 1985b, 243); (Haas, 2014). Or as Hegel writes: «The forms-
of-thought are first set-out and put-down in human language» (Hegel, 1974, 20).
17 Also see, for example: (Plato, 1922, Laws, X, 901c8–d2); (Kahn, 2003, XIIn11). 
18 (Keats, 1814–1891, 3.2, my emphasis). T. S. Elliot’s assessment is clear: «this line strikes me as 
a serious blemish on a beautiful poem; and the reason must be either that I fail to understand it, or that 
it is a statement which is untrue» (Brooks, 1949, 140). Being is not simply implied for poetic reasons: 
Keats does not exclude it because he needs ten syllables for the line to scan–there are multiple ways 
in which the poem could have been constructed in iambic pentameter. In other words, being is not 
implied so it fits the poem; rather, if it fits the poem, it is because being is implied.
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there, neither happening nor not-happening. So that being qua implication is the «still 
unravish’d bride of quietness», which haunts the poem; it is the meaning that — failing 
to present itself — cannot be grasped, understood, known. Thus, like the poem’s «Bold 
Lover», who cannot kiss the beloved, so too that being which is implied cannot come 
to presence and present itself, cannot be asserted or apodeicted, revealed or concealed, 
demonstrated or determined; although nor can it remain absent and in absence — for it 
is merely an implication.
Or, in Russian present tense, the first line of Notes from Underground reads: «Я че-
ловек больной... Я злой человек» (Dostoevsky, 1864). But Pevear and Volokhonsky 
translate: «I am a sick man . . . I am a wicked man» (Dostoyevsky, 1993, 1). Again, 
the translation is not «wrong», it is «right». But the text says: «I man sick», or — as 
Russian word order (like Greek) is flexible — «I sick man…I wicked man». And there 
is no «is»; being is not there; it is not present and does not come to presence, although 
nor is it absent; it is not necessary to write being between subject and predicate, nor is it 
actually even possible, without doing a certain kind of injustice — if not violence — to 
implication, to being, to the being (and unity and time and aspect) of being, so to think-
ing and speaking, doing and imagining and feeling, to «everything that is» — for being 
is, as every Russian speaker knows, only implied, an implication.
Language then, tells us that being is implied; it tells us what being is — namely, an 
implication. But what is that? Or more precisely: what does it mean to think how being 
is implied? For how can implication be thought as being? And so, as the being of some-
thing like a problem?
In fact, if an implication is neither present nor absent, but just implied — it is be-
cause implication is a problem.19 Then implied being — not only in speaking, but just as 
much in doing and thinking, or more precisely, in «everything that is» — is problematic. 
For implication is a way of being that suspends the necessity and contingency, the pos-
sibility and impossibility, of being there, of the event of coming to presence — indeed, 
of presence itself, and absence. So that which is problematic about the problem is that 
being (and unity, time, aspect) is only implied. Then being’s way of being is in suspense, 
neither something nor nothing, neither being nor non-being. For being is an implica-
tion — and so, tertium dator, a third thing, a problem to be held, kept, carried, borne. 
And if being can be asserted as a possibility, or apodeicted as a necessity, it is because 
being qua implication is first problematic. Thus the problem of being, that which is prob-
lematic about being, is the problem of implication, or how being is implied. 
19 For Grice, «echoing Kant», the Critique’s «Table of Judgments» means that implication is either 
necessary or possible, and tertium non dator (Grice, 1989, 26, 30, 38, 189); see also: (Kant, 1900, IV: 
A75/III: B100); (McColl, 1877, 10); (Frege, 1879, §5); (Whitehead & Russell, 1907, 20–21). In other 
words, Grice’s loyalty to Kant prevents him from thinking problematic implication. For being qua 
implication, see: (Haas, 2007a, 208–210).
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And not just being — for insofar as a problem is and is one, temporally and as-
pectually, it is, and so is problematic. But if we seek to take it up as a problem, keep it 
in suspension (like the problem of perfect justice, perhaps of any justice whatsoever), 
and so attempt to think that which does not come to presence, nor remains in absence, 
thereby to problematize the problem; then it seems we must also admit that none of this 
is necessary, nor actually even possible — for we cannot know what a problem is, or 
even that it is, that there is a problem; nor can we say that it is something or nothing at 
all. Rather, insofar as the problem is thinking the problematic, what the problem is, how 
it is implied; the problem would be to think the suspension of the problem — if we can 
bear it, and if it is to be problematic, whatever the implications — and so to think how 
the problem suspends thinking. For as Parmenides reminds us: it is not just a matter of 
speaking and thinking that which is, being as implied; but τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ 
εἶναι (Diels, 1960, B3), that is, speaking and thinking that thinking and being are the 
same, namely, problematic.
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